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Abstract
This paper seeks to provide a thorough account of the ubiquitous nature of the Bayesian paradigm in
modern statistics, data science and artificial intelligence. Once maligned, on the one hand by those who
philosophically hated the very idea of subjective probability used in prior specification, and on the other
hand because of the intractability of the computations needed for Bayesian estimation and inference, the
Bayesian school of thought now permeates and pervades virtually all areas of science, applied science,
engineering, social science and even liberal arts, often in unsuspected ways. Thanks in part to the
availability of powerful computing resources, but also to the literally unavoidable inherent presence of the
quintessential building blocks of the Bayesian paradigm in all walks of life, the Bayesian way of handling
statistical learning, estimation and inference is not only mainstream but also becoming the most central
approach to learning from the data. This paper explores some of the most relevant elements to help to
the reader appreciate the pervading power and presence of the Bayesian paradigm in statistics, artificial
intelligence and data science, with an emphasis on how the Gospel according to Reverend Thomas Bayes
has turned out to be the truly good news, and some cases the amazing saving grace, for all who seek to
learn statistically from the data. To further help the reader gain deeper and tangible practical insights
into the Bayesian machinery, we point to some computational tools designed for the R Statistical Software
Environment to help explore Bayesian statistical learning.
I. Introduction
"Dear Sir, I now send you an essay which I have found among the papers of our deceased friend Mr.
Bayes, and which, in my opinion, has great merit, and well deserves to be preserved." This first sentence
of the cover letter written by Mr John Canton F.R.S., who honorably introduced the manuscript
of the phenomenal work of the by then Late Reverend Thomas Bayes F.R.S, that first sentence
said I, could not have been more accurate when it said "has great merit, and well deserves to be
preserved". 254 years later, it is understatement to say that the work of Reverend Thomas Bayes,
introduced and developed in that manuscript, does permeate virtually every aspect of scientific
analysis involving the doctrine of chance and probability. It is so rich indeed in positively trans-
formative concepts that it won’t be an exaggeration to refer to it as the gospel according to Reverend
Thomas Bayes, judging by the sheer plurality of its applications to literally all areas of statistical
and probabilistic modelling. As a matter of fact, both explicitly and implicitly, an overwhelm-
ingly large number of the so-called learning machines in artificial intelligence, statistical machine
learning or data science, admit a Bayesian formulation often directly or after simple transfor-
mations. The multiplicity of such occurrences leads one to recognize the quasi-centrality of the
Bayesian paradigm in science in general. Indeed, To Bayes or Not To Bayes? is no longer the ques-
tion, but rather "How to Bayes?, since the Bayesian paradigm appears ubiquitous, permeating
and pervading every scientific activity involving the doctrine of chance and statistical learning
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from the data. In an era marked by the resurgence of artificial intelligence1 and the firm estab-
lishment of statistical machine learning as a force to reckon with, along with the meteoric rise
to prominence of the emerging field of data science, all of which have to deal with uncertainty
at their core, it makes sense the statistics, the natural language (along with sister probability)
for dealing with uncertainty, should permeate the very fabric of epistemology, theory, methodol-
ogy, computation and application. Interestingly, as we will see later, the famous Bayes’ theorem
(Bayes’ rule or Bayes’ formula as some call it) stands prominently and firmly at the very core,
providing a versatile, rich and powerful paradigm for modelling both the simplest and the most
complex of phenomena. From the fundamental algebra of finite sets of events to the estimation of
model parameters to infinite dimensional function approximation and estimation, the Bayesian
paradigm seems to find a way to emerge (sometimes almost miraculously) as the de-facto flexible
modelling framework for formulating and/or solving the task at hand. The goal of this paper
is not to preach the Gospel according Reverend Thomas Bayes, not is it aimed at reviewing the
sophisticated technical niceties of some seminal Bayesian fundamental results. Instead, our goal
is to provide a general bird’s eye view of the manifold incarnations of the Bayesian machinery
in artificial intelligence, statistical machine learning and data science. In its most generic and
canonical form, Bayes’ theorem is used to connect the conditional and marginal probabilities of
two events.
Theorem 1. Let A and B be two events with nonzero probabilities such Pr(A) > 0 and Pr(B), then the
conditional probability of B given that A has occurred, is given by
Pr(B|A) =
Pr(B) Pr(A|B)
Pr(A)
=
Pr(B) Pr(A|B)
Pr(B) Pr(A|B) + Pr(Bc) Pr(A|Bc)
. (1)
An extension deals with a collection B1, · · · ,BK ∈ Ω be mutually exclusive events, and their
probabilistic relationship with some event A ∈ Ω.
Theorem 2. LetA ∈ Ω be an event with nonzero probability such Pr(A) > 0, and consider the collection
of mutually exclusive events B1, · · · ,BK ∈ Ω such that Bk ∩ Bj = ∅, j 6= k and ∑
K
k=1 Pr(Bk) = 1, ie
∪Bk = Ω, then the conditional probability of Bk given that A has occurred, is given by
Pr(Bj|A) =
Pr(Bj) Pr(A|Bj)
Pr(A)
=
Pr(Bj) Pr(A|Bj)
∑
K
k=1 Pr(Bk) Pr(A|Bk)
. (2)
The central tenant of the Bayesian paradigm is the concept of posterior probability of an event.
For instance, Pr(Bj|A) in (2) is the posterior probability of event Bj given A, which measures
the probability that Bj will occur, given that A has occurred. This concept of posterior probabil-
ity provides a powerful mechanism for formulating, modelling and computing prediction and
predictive quantities of all kinds. It is important however to emphasize that prediction here is
not forecasting, nor is it meant in the sense of causation. Prediction here is meant in the sense
of dependent arising. In Bayesian parlance, Pr(Bj) represents the prior belief in Bj before the
dependent event A occurs, and in that sense, the posterior Pr(Bj|A) updates the belief in Bj
given that A has occurred. Pr(A) is referred to as the evidence by many in the Bayesian com-
munity, enjoys that appellation most appropriately in settings like Bayesian hypothesis testing
where Pr(H0| data) measures the probability that the null hypothesis is true given the evidence
provided by the data. Indeed this concept of evidence is key for a variety of reasons.
1Both the well known Weak Artificial Intelligence, and the highly anticipated Strong AI.
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II. Bayes’ Impact in Statistical Learning Theory
To help clarify all the above claims, let X and Y be two sets, and consider their Cartesian
product Z ≡ X × Y . Now, define Zn ≡ Z × Z × · · · × Z to be the n-fold cartesian product
of Z . Assume that Z is equipped with a probability measure ψ, and let z ∈ Zn, with z =
((x1, y1), (x2, y2) · · · , (xn, yn)) denote the realization of a random sample of n examples, where
each example zi = (xi, yi) is independently drawn according to the above probability measure ψ
on the product space Z ≡ X × Y . Now, given a random sample z = ((x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xn, yn))
and assuming that the probability measure ψ is unknown, find the function f : X → Y that best captures
the dependencies between the xi’s and the yi’s. We shall refer to X as the input space, and to Y
as the output space. For simplicity, we shall assume that X ⊆ Rp, and we shall also consider
both regression corresponding to Y = IR, and classification (pattern recognition) corresponding
to Y = {c1, c2, · · · , cg, · · · , cG}. This setting where one seeks to estimate a function f : X → Y , is
the foundational setting of machine learning in general and statistical machine learning in partic-
ular. This setting brings with the need to extend Bayes’ theorem from events to random variables,
especially with concepts of marginal density, conditional density and conditional expectation.
We see here that the Bayesian paradigm provides the perfect mechanism for the most funda-
mental results in pattern recognition, regression, hypothesis testing, signal detection, parameter
estimation, function estimation and statistical learning in general. In binary classification (pat-
tern recognition), the Bayesian framework provides a convenient language in the assessment of
a classifier f : X → Y , namely for computing the so-called True Positive Rate (TPR) and False
Positive Rate (FPR) which both use the concept of posterior probability. Indeed, the True Positive
Rate (TPR) of f is given by
TPR( f ) = Pr( f (X) = 1|Y = 1) =
Pr( f (X) = 1 andY = 1)
Pr(Y = 1)
,
and the False Positive Rate (FPR) of f is given by
FPR( f ) = Pr( f (X) = 1|Y = −1) =
Pr( f (X) = 1 andY = −1)
Pr(Y = −1)
.
In Bayesian hypothesis testing, the decision about the null hypothesis is conveniently made by
measuring the posterior probability of H0 given the data, which is given by
Pr(H0|Y = y) =
pY(y|H0) Pr(H0)
pY(y)
where Pr(H0) + Pr(Ha) = 1 and pY(y) = Pr(H0)pY(y|H0) + pY(y|Ha) Pr(Ha) is the density of
the data. It is interesting to note the error of the test is also conveniently defined and calculated
as
Error = Pr(H0 is chosen|Ha) Pr(Ha) + Pr(Ha is chosen|H0) Pr(H0).
When we consider the pattern recognition task once again along with the so-called 0/1 loss
function defined below, we encounter another fundamental pattern recognition result that has its
foundation in the Bayesian paradigm. More specifically, consider the 0/1 loss function
ℓ(y, f (x)) = I(y 6= f (x)) =
{
0 if y = f (x),
1 if y 6= f (x).
(3)
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With the zero-one loss function in classification, our corresponding true risk (also known as theo-
retical risk or generalization error or true error) is given by
R( f ) =
∫
ℓ(y, f (x))dψ(x, y) = E [I(Y 6= f (X))] = Prob(X,Y)∼ψ[Y 6= f (X)]. (4)
The true error R( f ) of a classifier f therefore defines the probability that f misclassifies any
arbitrary observation randomly draw from the population of interest according to the distribution
ψ. It is important to note from the definition that R( f ) can also be interpreted as the expected
disagreement between classifier f and the truth about the label y of x.
Definition 1. How is the Bayes’ classifier obtained? Consider a pattern x from the input space, and
a class label y. Let p(x|y) denote the class conditional density of x in class y, and let Prob[Y = y] denote
the prior probability of class membership. The posterior probability of class membership is defined as
Prob[Y = y|x] =
Prob[Y = y]p(x|y)
p(x)
.
Given a pattern x to be classified, the Bayes classification strategy consists of assigning x to the class
with maximum posterior probability. More formally, with h denoting the function from X to Y that
implements the Bayes classifier, we have, ∀x ∈ X ,
h(x) = argmax
c∈Y
{Prob(Y = c|x)} . (5)
Theorem 3. The minimizer of the 0/1 risk functional over all possible classifiers is the Bayes classifier
h defined in (5).
f ∗ = arginf
f
{R( f )} = arginf
f
{E [I(Y 6= f (X))]} = arginf
f
{
Prob(X,Y)∼ψ[Y 6= f (X)]
}
= h. (6)
Therefore, the Bayes’ classifier h defined in (5), is the universal best classifier, such that ∀x ∈ X ,
f ∗(x) = h(x) = argmax
c∈Y
{Prob(Y = c|x)} . (7)
The risk R∗ corresponding to f ∗ is the smallest possible error that any classifier can achieve, i.e.,
R∗ = R( f ∗) = R(h) = inf
f
{R( f )} .
This result, namely that the Bayes classifier achieves the universal (global) minimum (infimum)
error over all measurable classifiers, is fundamental result in pattern recognition and statistical
learning. The probability theory for pattern recognition is made up of multiple results featuring
learning machines whose performance are compared to the performance of the Bayes’ classifier.
Devroye et al. (1997) and Vapnik (2000). A similar fundamental statistical learning result exists
for regression, namely that under the so-called squared error loss, the universal best function is
the conditional expectation of Y given X.
Theorem 4. Consider functions f : IRp → IR, and the squared risk functional
R( f ) = E[(Y− f (X)2] =
∫
X×Y
(y− f (x))2p(x, y)dxdy.
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Then the best function f ∗ = arginf
f
{R( f )} is given by the conditional expectation of Y given X, so that
∀x ∈ X ,
f ∗(x) = arginf
f
{R( f (x))} = E[Y|X = x] =
∫
Y
y p(y|x)dy (8)
Proposition 1. For every f : X → Y ,
R( f ) =
∫
X
( f (x)− f ∗(x))2d ψ(x) + σ2∗ .
We see that for both regression and classification, the Bayesian paradigm provides the best mech-
anism, at the very least in theory, which is indeed very important. It is worth mentioning that
for most people, the Bayesian school of thought is typically not introduced through results like
the ones we just described, but instead through Bayesian estimation and inference in parametric
families of models. It is our view that both the Bayes’ classifier and the Bayes regressor are just as
valuable members of the Bayes’ heritage as are the vastly studied results in both parametric and
nonparametric Bayesian estimation, inference prediction. Although the results described earlier
were in their purely theoretical forms, applications abound that are based on those foundational
results. Studying pattern recognition and regression with solid knowledge of both the Bayes’
classifier and the Bayes regressor which provide the best in both cases is of vital importance2. It
is my view that in sensu lato, all statistical learning methods are offshoots of the Bayesian ma-
chinery in the sense the Bayesian learner under the two most commonly loss functions is always
the optimal, indeed the standard. In that sense, most so-called non-Bayesians or anti-Bayesians
are inherently Bayesians at their core, at least in the most quintessential sense of those universal
optimality results that all learning machines essentially attempt to attain.
III. Bayes’ Impact in Statistical Estimation and Inference
Now, the best known setup where the richness of the Bayesian paradigm is practically and more
directly revealed, is encountered when we assume that the task of learning the function f , is
associated with the estimation of a parameter θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rp such that, when treated as a random
variable, the probability density function of θ is given by p(θ). This is encountered for models
involving (a) Parametric density estimation along with elements of prediction; (b) Parametric
function estimation along with prediction, when f (x) = f (x; θ). In both cases, a key quantity is
the posterior density of the parameter θ given the data, namely
p(θ|Y) =
p(θ)p(Y|θ)
p(Y)
, (9)
where p(Y|θ) is the likelihood of θ, and p(Y) is the evidence, sometimes referred to as the
marginal likelihood of the underlying model. Recall that the likelihood of θ is the joint den-
sity of the data vector Y given the unknown parameter θ, i.e. Likelihood(θ) = p(Y|θ). The
maximum likelihood principle is arguably the most commonly tool/approach in statistical anal-
ysis because of the central role the likelihood plays in statistical modelling. Now, the maximum
2Most people think of the Bayesian paradigm the sensu stricto where there is a very involved and often complex
and sometimes controversial topic of prior specification. Our treatment of the Bayesian idea is definitely in sensu lato,
and encompasses all modeling situations where the posterior density or the posterior probability is part of the modeling
mechanism. Our intention is not to trigger an epistemological debate, quite far from it.
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likelihood estimator θ̂(MLE) of θ is given by
θ̂(MLE) = argmax
θ∈Θ
{Likelihood(θ)} = argmax
θ∈Θ
{p(Y|θ)} , (10)
while the Bayesian estimator θ̂(Bayes) of θ under the squared error loss, is
θ̂(Bayes) = argmin
a∈Θ
{
E[(θ − a)2|Y]
}
= E[θ|Y] =
∫
Θ
θp(θ|Y)dθ. (11)
A very nice property of both Maximum Likelihood and Bayesian Estimators is that for all contin-
uous functions g(·),
ĝ(θ)
(Bayes)
= E[g(θ)|Y] =
∫
Θ
g(θ)p(θ|Y)dθ.
Also the Bayesian paradigm inherently addresses the important predictive density of any new
element of y(new) ∈ Y , which is given by
p(ynew|Y) =
∫
Θ
p(ynew|θ)p(θ|Y)dθ.
The Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) Estimator is another type, albeit sometimes deemed inferior,
of Bayesian estimator, given by
θ̂(MAP) = argmax
θ∈Θ
{p(θ|Y)} = argmax
θ∈Θ
{p(θ)p(Y|θ)}
= argmax
θ∈Θ
{log p(θ) + log p(Y|θ)}
= argmax
θ∈Θ
{log Prior(θ) + log Likelihood(θ)} .
Note that if the prior density p(θ) is uniform, i.e. p(θ) = c, then we have
θ̂(MAP) = θ̂(Bayes) = argmax
θ∈Θ
{log p(Y|θ)} = argmax
θ∈Θ
{Likelihood(θ)} = θ̂(MLE)
The Bayesian paradigm is therefore an extension and a generalization of the maximum likelihood principle,
an extension that affords greater modelling flexibility, and consequently the capability to solve a wider
class of problems. The maximum likelihood estimator is a special case of the Bayesian estimator. Another
powerful property inherent in the Bayesian paradigm is its inherent shrinkage and regularization
capability, which turns out to be a powerful remedy that helps circumvent a wide variety of
modelling challenges. To gain deeper insights into this regularization and shrinkage property,
we consider the Bernoulli experiment, with the parameter θ ∈ (0, 1) representing the probability
of success, and Yi ∈ {0, 1} such that
Y1,Y2, · · · ,Yn
iid
∼ Bernoulli(θ)
We have
p(yi|θ) = θ
yi(1− θ)1−yi
6
Under the conjugacy principle, the conjugate prior for θ is
p(θ|a, b) =
Γ(a+ b)
Γ(a)Γ(b)
θa−1(1− θ)b−1
It can be shown that the posterior density of θ is given by
p(θ|Dn) =
Γ(a+ b+ n)
Γ(Sn + a)Γ(n− Sn + b)
θSn+a−1(1− θ)n−Sn+b−1
Which means that (θ|Dn) ∼ Beta(a+ Sn, b+ Fn). Now we
θ̂(Bayes) = E[θ|Y] =
∫
Θ
θp(θ|Y)dθ =
a+ Sn
a+ b+ n
Notice
θ̂(Bayes) =
a+ Sn
a+ b+ n
=
a+ b
a+ b+ n
a
a+ b
+
n
a+ b+ n
Sn/n
a+ b+ n
= wnθ̂0 + (1−wn)θ̂(MLE)
The Bayesian "point" estimator θ̂(Bayes) is therefore a convex combination of the prior estimate
with the maximum likelihood estimator. Indeed, lim
n→∞
wn = 0. As a result,
lim
n→∞
θ̂(Bayes) = θ̂(MLE)
Which means that as more data becomes available, the posterior density is dominated by the like-
lihood, so that the asymptotically the Bayesian estimator coincide with the maximum likelihood
estimator. In this sense, the prior is bringing to the estimation (learning) task, items of informa-
tion that the data from the sampling process does not contain, and this is crucial. As more data
becomes available, the information brought by the prior is then overwhelmed by the information
richly provided by large amounts of data. This serves as the basis for resorting to the Bayesian
paradigm in situations where there isn’t enough data to carry the modelling task at hand.
IV. Bayes’ Impact in Statistical Function Estimation
To better understand this, we consider multiple linear regression under the Gaussian homoscedas-
tic noise model, (Y|X, θ, σ2) ∼ Nn(Xθ, σ2In), for which the likelihood of θ is simply
L(θ|X,Y) = p(Y|X, θ, σ2) = φn(Y;Xθ, σ
2In) =
1√
(2piσ2)n
exp
(
−
1
2σ2
(Y− Xθ)⊤(Y− Xθ)
)
.
The maximum likelihood estimator θ̂(MLE) of θ is the well-known
θ̂(MLE) = argmax
θ∈Θ
{L(θ|X,Y)} = (X⊤X)−1X⊤Y. (12)
Combining the fact that θ̂(MLE) ∼ Np(θ, σ2(X⊤X)−1) with the conjugate prior θ ∼ Np(θ0, σ
2Λ−10 ),
the Bayesian estimator θ̂(Bayes) of the vector θ of regression coefficients, is given by
θ̂(Bayes) = E[θ|Y] = (X⊤X+ Λ0)
−1(X⊤Xθ̂(MLE) + Λ0θ0). (13)
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The famous ridge regression estimator θ̂
(ridge)
λ of θ first proposed by Hoerl and Kennard (1970b)
and Hoerl and Kennard (1970a) is shown to be special case of the above Bayesian estimator when
Λ0 = λI. Specifically,
θ̂
(ridge)
λ = argmin
θ∈Θ
{
(Y− Xθ)⊤(Y− Xθ) + λθ⊤θ
}
= (X⊤X+ λI)−1X⊤Y
= E[θ|Y] = θ̂(Bayes) (14)
It is easy to verify (check) that the maximum likelihood estimator is a special case of the Bayesian
estimator, in the sense that
lim
λ→∞
θ̂
(ridge)
λ = limλ→∞
(X⊤X+ λI)−1X⊤Y = (X⊤X)−1X⊤Y = θ̂(MLE).
It also easy to see that the ridge estimator is a shrinkage estimator, with the tendency to shrink
all the components of the vector to zero together as λ gets ever larger. Specifically,
lim
λ→∞
θ̂
(ridge)
λ = 0.
Of great importance to big data analytics is the fact that between the two extremes of zero λ and
infinite λ, lies a value of λ that achieves the trade-off between bias and variance, and thereby
achieves the smallest cross validation error. The fact that the Bayesian estimator is inherently (by
its very design) biased, used to be a subject of great debates, until numerous findings revealed
that unbiasedness while a desired property, is not the be all and end all of statistical estimation
and inference, quite far from it. It turns out that most scientific endeavors reveal the fundamental
need for a trade-off between bias and variance. For the regression example mentioned earlier,
when we (a) either have multicollinearity in the design matrix or (b) the data matrix X is high
dimensional but with a very low sample size (n≪ p, underdetermined system), the maximum
likelihood estimator is theoretical unbiased but has an ill-conditioned variance matrix that leads
to non-existence or non uniqueness or severe instability. Even in case where a numerical solution
can realized, the variance is inflated because of the near singularity. The Bayesian approach
via ridge regression for instance yields a solution, albeit biased, but with a reduced variance.
In fact, in the n ≪ p it is impossible to have any solution without a device like the ridge
approach. This is the kind of scenarios that make us say that the Bayesian paradigm is a gospel,
meaning good news, as it allows workable solution where none appears to exist. Solutions like
ridge are nowadays ubiquitous in statistical machine learning and belong to a class of machine
learning approaches known as regularization methods, where all the techniques consist of adding
constraints to an ill-posed problem to hopefully achieve well-posedness in Hadamard’s sense. All
the methods in the regularization framework are centered around the regularized empirical risk
Rreg( f ) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
ℓ(Yi, f (Xi)) + λ‖ f‖H
where ‖ f‖H is the norm of f in the function space H. For the linear regression learning task
for instance, the ridge regularization mentioned earlier has evolved (been developed) alongside
the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) proposed by Tibshirani (1996)
Tibshirani (1994), which admits a Bayesian formulation using a Laplace prior on θ, but does not
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yield a closed-form solution like the ridge estimator.
θ̂
(lasso)
λ = argmin
θ∈Θ
{
(Y− Xθ)⊤(Y− Xθ) + λ‖θ‖1
}
(15)
The well known greatest strength of the LASSO estimator comes from the fact that it does achieve
sparsity and therefore is used for variable selection. Just like the ridge solution, the LASSO,
through regularization, is inherently able to yield a solution where the MLE would at best be
very unstable. It is interesting to see that the LASSO estimator does indeed select along with
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Figure 1: Depiction of the solution path: (left) ridge shrinkage (right) lasso selection on the attitude dataset
shrinkage whereas the ridge estimator simply shrinks while maintaining all the six initial vari-
ables. Combining ridge and lasso, one gets
Rreg( f ) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
ℓ(Yi, f (Xi)) + λPenaltyα(θ),
where Penaltyα(θ) = (1− α)‖θ‖1+ α‖θ‖2 is the so-called elastic net penalty. Several implementa-
tions exist in R, including Friedman et al. (2010) and Simon et al. (2011). Figures (1) and (2) depict
the application of the elastic net penalty to regression analysis learning task on a 6-dimensional
dataset known as the attitude, where the goal is to regress the rating of companies to six variables,
namely complaints, learning, privileges, raises, critical, advance. Different prior probability distribu-
tions (ridge or lasso) on the parameter space, yield difference solution paths, Figure (1). LASSO
selects a small subset of variables, whereas ridge keeps them all, albeit while shrinking all of them
together towards zero. Once again, the goal of this paper, is not to explicate the technical niceties
of the Bayesian paradigm, but instead draw the reader’s attention on its immense modelling po-
tential. As a matter of fact, the above regularization framework based on the elastic net, helps
tackle and solve many predictive analytics task in high dimension and low sample size situations
as arises with DNA Gene Expression Microarray Data and several other large p small n tasks.
It bears repeating that all the above pearls of statistical modeling, while set up in the so-called
regularization framework, do inherently admit a Bayesian formulation. Like we said earlier, "To
Bayes or Not Bayes?" is no longer the question, but rather "How am I making the most of Bayes?".
The key seems to lie in the specification of carefully thought out prior densities that allow one
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Figure 2: Depiction of the tuning of λ: (left) ridge (right) lasso, on the attitude dataset
to isolate precisely the kind of solution desired out of the multiplicity of solutions. Wherever
there is statistical learning, especially in settings where there is an ill-posedness challenge, the Bayesian
paradigm is forever available as a formidable weapon in the statistical scientist’s modelling arsenal. We
see the power of the Bayesian thought directly or indirectly in state of the art settings such Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) for Topic Modelling Blei et al. (2003). The forever useful Kalman filter,
thanks to the latent space has also benefitted heavily from the power of the Bayesian paradigm
Haug (2012a), Haug (2012b) and Haug (2012c). Even before the blessings of affordable computa-
tion ushered in the glorious era of the Bayesian thought, Markov Random Fields were being used
for the Statistical Analysis of Dirty Pictures Besag (1986), already anchoring the palpable power
of the Gospel according to Reverend Thomas Bayes. And yes, modern artificial intelligence as
also benefitted very immensely from the flexibility that the combination of likelihood with prior
affords the statistical scientists, in Neal (1996), we see that the explosion of Neural Networks as
tools for artificial intelligence and learning was quickly found to have a nice connection to the
Bayesian paradigm, and even now works like Fortunato et al. (2017) demonstrate the great appeal
of the Bayesian approach for the now very fashionable and in vogue Networks as well. MacKay
(1991) gives a detailed account of Bayesian interpolation and introduces the now popular and
widely used concept of automatic relevance determination (ARD). As a matter of fact, Tipping
(2001)’s Sparse Bayesian Learning and the Relevance Vector Machine (RVM) is a nice piece of
work inspired by a combination of MacKay (1991) and Vapnik et al. (1996). Interestingly, a little
after Tipping (2001), we get Sollich (2002) exploring Bayesian Methods for Support Vector Ma-
chines and more recently Henao et al. (2014) with an interesting account of Bayesian Nonlinear
Support Vector Machine. Williams and Rasmussen (1996)’s work on Gaussian process regression
and later Csató et al. (2000a) with Efficient Algorithms for Bayesian Gaussian Processes, both
ushered in a series of contributions in machine learning featuring Bayesian Gaussian processes
for regression and classification, later crystalized in Rasmussen and Williams (2006) which has
become one of the main textbook for the use of Bayesian Gaussian processes in machine learn-
ing. Csató et al. (2000b) explore ideas of variational mean field approximations featuring efficient
Approaches to Bayesian Gaussian Process Classification. Gaussian Process Priors open the door
to a vast universe of nonparametric statistical modelling in the Bayesian framework. This use
of prior distributions over function spaces central to Gaussian process learning has recently be-
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come mainstream in Bayesian Nonparametric statistical analysis, anchored by the seminal work
on the introduction of the Dirirchlet process prior by Ferguson (1973) and Ferguson (1974) which
has enriched the statistician and data scientist’s modelling arsenal with a formidably powerful
weapon in nonparametric statistical analysis, especially allowing prior distributions on function
spaces and infinite dimensional spaces in general. The recent years have been marked by what
is literally an explosion of methods which are derivatives of or inspired by the seminal work of
Ferguson (1973) and Ferguson (1974). With Bayesian nonparametrics providing extra modelling
strength and flexibility to statisticians and data scientists, the vast territory of application of the
Bayesian paradigm just keeps on expanding, further justifying our view that the Gospel according
to Reverend Thomas Bayes is indeed ubiquitous, pervading and permeating the whole of science.
Statistical Machine Learning from its very early days both implicit and explicitly gave a promi-
nent platform and a loud speaking voice to the Bayesian school of thought, gaussian processes
and Dirichlet processes have increased the volume of the loud speaker. In Bayesian computa-
tion, the 1990 seminal work of Gelfand and Smith (1990) introduce the world to the power of the
Gibbs Sampler, and made it possible for Bayesian statisticians to tackle and successfully solve
many statistical modeling problems which had eclipsed them until that milestone. After the
Gelfand and Smith (1990) paper that launched the Bayesian Computation revolution, software
packages like BUGS(Bayesian Inference with the Gibbs Sampler) began to emerge, making
it more and more possible for Bayesians to actually solve interesting and meaningful real life
problems. Implementations abound that help practitioners experiment and applied the power of
the Gibbs sampler Plummer (2003). The statistical software environment R has many packages
and an entire view install.view(Bayesian) that contain various functions for Bayesian analyses of
all kinds. As a matter of fact, with the development of Bayesian computation which marked
the birth of a collection of methods known as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods,
literally every aspect of statistical benefitted from the modelling power of the Bayesian paradigm.
The development of Bayesian computation also allowed substantial progress in Bayesian model
selection and Bayesian variable selection. Among other contributions, we have Spike and Slab
Ishwaran and Rao (2005) and more recently work on featuring mixtures of g-Priors for Bayesian
variable selection Liang et al. (2008). The Bayesian Model Averaging for Linear Regression Mod-
els by Raftery et al. (1997) was later supplemented by a tutorial Hoeting et al. (1999), that further
helped put practical BMA on a firm foundation. Later, Barbieri and Berger (2002) provided op-
timal predictive model selection via the so-called Bayesian median model. The Estimation of
Atom Prevalence for Optimal Prediction Fokoué (2008) sought to be a flexible and more adaptive
counterpart to Barbieri and Berger (2002) As we said earlier, the intention of this paper is far
from any attempt to provide an exhaustive technical exploration of the Bayesian paradigm. That
would be gargantuan and virtually impossible. Instead, we have sought throughout and hope
to have given the reader a visceral sense of the appeal of the Bayesian paradigm as a statistical
machine learning tool for data science. We complete by mentioning a few contributions of the
Bayesian paradigm to latent variable modelling and kernel regression, with works like Fokoué
(2011) which introduces a stable Radial Basis Function Selection via Mixture Modelling of the
Sample Path, and Fokoué et al. (2011) that extends it with a fully Bayesian Analysis of the Rel-
evance Vector Machine With Extended Prior. Fokoué (2009) proposes and develops a Bayesian
computation of the Intrinsic Structure of Factor Analytic Models, drawing some of its elements
from Fokoué and Titterington (2003) where mixtures of Factor Analysers featuring Bayesian Esti-
mation and Inference by Stochastic Simulation.
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V. Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we have provided a general bird’s eye view of the manifold ways in which the
Bayesian paradigm has become one of the main tools in the arsenal of all statisticians and data
scientists. In our experience and observation, human statistical thought and perception as wit-
nessed in interval estimation and hypothesis testing appears to be inherently and quintessentially
Bayesian: indeed when non statisticians are asked to interpret confidence intervals or pvalues,
most (if not all) say things that are essentially credible sets or posterior probabilities of hypothe-
ses. It does seem that our human statistical thought quintessentially agrees with the Bayesian
principle. When it comes to decision making under uncertainty, It is virtually impossible to find
a field of study in science or otherwise that has not been heavily and positively by the power of
the Bayesian paradigm. Uncertainty is ideally dealt with using the powerful language of probabil-
ity, hence the appropriateness of the assignment of property to all unknown quantities, including
parameters unfortunately treated by others as fixed. The Bayesian approach is the only way to
properly deal with latent variable models. What other way exists to properly model a random
variable other than specify or estimate its distribution from the data Penalized Least Squares Esti-
mation turns out to admit a natural Bayesian formulation with penalties capturing a prior belief
about distributional aspects of the parameters or function class of interest. In sensu lato and senso
stricto, the likelihood principle is a special case (subset) of the Bayesian paradigm. The inherent
capacity of the Bayesian paradigm to extend the likelihood principle can be likened to the way in
which the relativity theory contributed by Albert Einstein extended, enriched and revolutionized
Isaac Newton’s fundamental laws of physics. The gospel according to Reverend Thomas Bayes
lives on and keeps on gaining more power and transform more lives through its impact in science,
statistical machine learning and data science From an unpublished manuscript, the revolutionary
idea of Reverend Thomas Bayes has become one of the most consequential and most pervading
transformative concepts in the whole of science and epistemology. Indeed, wherever there is a
bona fide likelihood, there is room for Bayes.
References
Barbieri, M. M. and J. O. Berger (2002). Optimal predictive model selection. Ann. Statist 32,
870–897.
Besag, J. (1986). On the statistical analysis of dirty pictures. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.
Series B (Methodological) 48(3), 259–302.
Blei, D. M., A. Y. Ng, and M. I. Jordan (2003, March). Latent dirichlet allocation. J. Mach. Learn.
Res. 3, 993–1022.
Csató, L., E. Fokoué, M. Opper, B. Schottky, and O. Winther (2000a). Efficient approaches to
gaussian process classification. In S. A. Solla, T. K. Leen, and K. Müller (Eds.), Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems 12, pp. 251–257. MIT Press.
Csató, L., E. Fokoué, M. Opper, B. Schottky, and O. Winther (2000b). Efficient approaches to
gaussian process classification. In T. K. L. S. A. Solla and K.-R. M. eds. (Eds.), Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems, Number 12 in 12. MIT Press.
Devroye, L., L. Györfi, and G. Lugosi (1997). A Probabilistic Theory of Pattern Recognition. Stochastic
Modelling and Applied Probability. Springer New York.
12
Ferguson, T. S. (1973, 03). A bayesian analysis of some nonparametric problems. Ann. Statist. 1(2),
209–230.
Ferguson, T. S. (1974, 07). Prior distributions on spaces of probability measures. Ann. Statist. 2(4),
615–629.
Fokoué, E. (2008). Estimation of atom prevalence for optimal prediction. contemporary. Contem-
porary Mathematics 443, 103–129.
Fokoué, E. (2009). Bayesian computation of the intrinsic structure of factor analytic models.
Journal of Data Science 7(3), 285–311.
Fokoué, E. (2011, October). Stable radial basis function selection via mixture modelling of the
sample path. Journal of Data Science 9(3), 345–358.
Fokoué, E., D. Sun, and P. Goel (2011). Fully bayesian analysis of the relevance vector machine
with extended prior. Statistical Methodology 8, 83–96.
Fokoué, E. and D. M. Titterington (2003). Mixtures of factor analysers: Bayesian estimation and
inference by stochastic simulation. Machine Learning 50, 73–94.
Fortunato, M., C. Blundell, and O. Vinyals (2017). Bayesian recurrent neural networks.
CoRR abs/1704.02798.
Friedman, J., T. Hastie, and R. Tibshirani (2010). Regularization paths for generalized linear
models via coordinate descent. Journal of Statistical Software 33(1), 1–22.
Gelfand, A. E. and A. F. M. Smith (1990). Sampling-based approaches to calculating marginal
densities. Journal of the American Statistical Association 85(410), 398–409.
Haug, A. (2012a). Bayesian estimation for target tracking: part i, general concepts. Wiley Interdis-
ciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics 4(4), 375–383.
Haug, A. (2012b). Bayesian estimation for target tracking: part ii, the gaussian sigma-point
kalman filters. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics 4(5), 489–497.
Haug, A. (2012c). Bayesian estimation for target tracking, part iii: Monte carlo filters. Wiley
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics 4(5), 498–512.
Henao, R., X. Yuan, and L. Carin (2014). Bayesian nonlinear support vector machines and discrim-
inative factor modeling. In Z. Ghahramani, M. Welling, C. Cortes, N. D. Lawrence, and K. Q.
Weinberger (Eds.), Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 27, pp. 1754–1762. Curran
Associates, Inc.
Hoerl, A. E. and R. W. Kennard (1970a). Ridge regression: Applications to nonorthogonal prob-
lems. Technometrics 12, 69–82.
Hoerl, A. E. and R. W. Kennard (1970b). Ridge regression: Biased estimation for nonorthogonal
problems. Technometrics 12, 55–67.
Hoeting, J. A., D. Madigan, A. E. Raftery, and C. T. Volinsky (1999). Bayesian model averaging:
A tutorial. STATISTICAL SCIENCE 14(4), 382–417.
Ishwaran, H. and J. S. Rao (2005, 04). Spike and slab variable selection: Frequentist and bayesian
strategies. Ann. Statist. 33(2), 730–773.
13
Liang, F., R. Paulo, G. Molina, M. A. Clyde, and J. O. Berger (2008). Mixtures of g-priors for
bayesian variable selection. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 423.
MacKay, D. J. (1991). Bayesian interpolation. Neural Computation 4, 415–447.
Neal, R. M. (1996). Bayesian Learning for Neural Networks. Secaucus, NJ, USA: Springer-Verlag
New York, Inc.
Plummer, M. (2003). JAGS: A program for analysis of Bayesian graphical models using Gibbs
sampling. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Distributed Statistical Computing.
Raftery, A. E., D. Madigan, and J. A. Hoeting (1997). Bayesian model averaging for linear regres-
sion models. Journal of the American Statistical Association 92(437), 179–191.
Rasmussen, C. and C. Williams (2006, January). Gaussian Processes for Machine Learning. Adaptive
Computation and Machine Learning. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Simon, N., J. Friedman, T. Hastie, and R. Tibshirani (2011). Regularization paths for cox’s propor-
tional hazards model via coordinate descent. Journal of Statistical Software 39(5), 1–13.
Sollich, P. (2002). Bayesian methods for support vector machines: Evidence and predictive class
probabilities. Machine Learning 46, 21–52.
Tibshirani, R. (1994). Regression shrinkage and selection via the lasso. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society, Series B 58, 267–288.
Tibshirani, R. (1996). Regression shrinkage and selection via the lasso. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society. Series B (Methodological) 58(1), 267–288.
Tipping, M. E. (2001). Sparse bayesian learning and the relevance vector machine. Journal of
Machine Learning Research 1, 211–244.
Vapnik, V., S. E. Golowich, and A. J. Smola (1996). Support vector method for function approxi-
mation, regression estimation and signal processing. In NIPS, pp. 281–287. MIT Press.
Vapnik, V. N. (2000). The Nature of Statistical Learning Theory. Springer.
Williams, C. K. I. and C. E. Rasmussen (1996). Gaussian processes for regression. In Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems 8, pp. 514–520. MIT press.
14
